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EXPLAINING THE PREVALENCE OF THE INFORMAL ECONOMY 
IN THE BALTICS: AN INSTITUTIONAL ASYMMETRY 
PERSPECTIVE  
 
 
Abstract 
Reporting a 2013 Eurobarometer survey of participation in the informal economy across 
eight Baltic countries, this paper tentatively explains the informal economy from an 
institutional perspective as associated with the asymmetry between the codified laws and 
regulations of the formal institutions (state morality) and the norms, values and beliefs of 
citizens (civic morality). Identifying that this non-alignment of civic morality with the 
formal rules is more acute when there is greater poverty and inequality, less effective 
redistribution and lower levels of state intervention in the labour market and welfare, the 
implications for theorising and tackling the informal economy are then discussed.  
 
Keywords: informal sector; tax morale; social contract; institutional analysis; Baltics. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, numerous studies have revealed that the informal economy is not some minor 
peripheral feature but a large and growing sphere in the Baltic states (Kukk and Staehr, 2014; 
Meriküll and Staehr, 2010; Putni৆ã and Sauka, 2014a,b). As Putni৆ã and Sauka (2014b) 
reveal, the informal economy is the equivalent of 23.8% of GDP in Latvia, 15.7% in Estonia 
and 15.2% in Lithuania. Tackling the informal economy therefore, is essential because of not 
only the public revenue losses but also the resulting lack of control over the quality of working 
conditions, weakened trade union and collective bargaining and unfair competition for 
legitimate businesses (Andrews et al., 2011; ILO, 2014; OECD, 2014; TUC, 2008; Williams, 
2014a).  
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This paper advances knowledge by proposing tentatively a new way of explaining the 
informal economy that results in a very different approach towards tackling this sphere than 
has so far been adopted. Drawing inspiration from institutional theory, all societies are viewed 
as possessing not only formal institutions (i.e., codified laws and regulations) but also 
informal institutions which are socially shared unwritten rules that express the wider norms, 
values and beliefs of the population (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004; 
North, 1990). The proposition in this paper is that the greater is the non-alignment of these 
formal and informal institutions, the greater is the likelihood of participation in the informal 
economy. When the norms, values and beliefs of the informal institutions (i.e., here termed 
µFLYLFmorality¶ do not align with the codified laws and regulations of the formal institutions 
(i.e., here termed µstate morality¶, such as due to a lack of trust in government, the likelihood 
of participating in the informal economy will be higher. The aim of this paper is to evaluate 
the validity of this institutional asymmetry thesis and, through an identification of the reasons 
for this asymmetry, to formulate a new policy approach for tackling the informal economy.  
In the next section therefore, the previous explanations for the prevalence of the 
informal economy will be briefly reviewed along with how institutional theory provides a 
potentially new lens for doing so. To evaluate the proposition that the prevalence of the 
informal economy is associated with the DV\PPHWU\ EHWZHHQ µVWDWH PRUDOLW\¶ DQG µFLYLF
PRUDOLW\¶ and the reasons for this, the third section then introduces a 2013 survey involving 
8,548 face-to-face interviews in eight Baltic nations (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden) followed in the fourth section by the results of an ordered 
logistic regression analysis evaluating the association between participation in the informal 
economy and the degree of institutional asymmetry. The fifth and final section then tentatively 
discusses some potential theoretical and policy implications. 
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 Reflecting the widespread consensus, the informal economy is here defined as paid 
activities not declared to the authorities for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes 
when they should be but which are otherwise legal in all respects (European Commission, 
2007; OECD, 2012; Schneider, 2008; Schneider and Williams, 2013; Williams et al., 2012). 
The only illegal aspect about the informal economy therefore, is that these paid activities are 
not declared for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes when they should be. If paid 
activities differ in other respects to formal work, which is paid work declared to the authorities 
for tax, social security and/or labour law purposes, then they are not here defined as part of the 
informal economy. For example, if paid activities involve the exchange of illegal goods and/or 
services (e.g., illegal drugs), then these activities are not part of the informal economy but 
rather WKHZLGHUµFULPLQDO¶HFRQRP\(Williams, 2014a). As with all definitions, nevertheless, 
there exist fuzzy edges, such as when payment is in the form of gifts or reciprocal labour 
instead of money. In this paper however, only paid activities are included in the definition of 
the informal economy.  
 
2. EXPLAINING THE INFORMAL ECONOMY: AN INSTITUTIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 
Numerous studies have revealed how the prevalence of the informal economy varies not only 
cross-nationally (ILO, 2012; Schneider and Williams, 2013) but also locally and regionally 
(Kesteloot and Meert, 1999) and by employment status (Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013), age 
(Pedersen, 2003), gender (ILO, 2013) and income level (Barbour and Llanes, 2013; Williams, 
2009). The outcome has been a more contextualised understanding which recognises how the 
informal economy can be large and growing in some populations, but smaller and declining in 
others (Pfau-Effinger, 2009; Williams and Horodnic, 2015). 
5 
 
To explain the varying prevalence of the informal economy, and as Williams 
(2014b,c) highlights, three main competing explanations exist. µMRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶ theory 
explains the prevalence of the informal economy in terms of the lack of economic 
GHYHORSPHQWDQGPRGHUQLVDWLRQRIJRYHUQDQFHµQHR-OLEHUDO¶theory explains the informal 
economy as resulting from high taxes and over-burdensome regulations DQG µSROLWLFDO
HFRQRP\¶theory conversely explains the informal economy as resulting from inadequate 
state intervention and a lack of safeguards for citizens. All these theoretical approaches 
however, fail to explain why some individuals and population groups facing the same 
country-level structural conditions participate in the informal economy and others do not; 
put another way, agency is missing from such accounts. 
Here therefore, a new way of explaining and tackling the informal economy is 
proposed that draws inspiration from institutional theory (Baumol and Blinder, 2008; Helmke 
and Levitsky, 2004; North, 1990). Viewing institutions as the cognitive, normative and 
regulative structures that give meaning to social behaviour (Scott, 1995), all societies are 
viewed as having codified regulations and laws (i.e., formal institutions) that constitute the 
legal rules of the game, and LQIRUPDOLQVWLWXWLRQVZKLFKDUHWKHµVRFLDOO\VKDUHGUXOHVXVXDOO\
unwritten, that are created, communicated and enforced outside of officially sanctioned 
channelV¶ +HOPNH DQG /HYLWVN\, 2004: 727). Viewed through this institutional lens, the 
proposition in this paper is that when formal and informal institutions are in symmetry, and 
consequently state and civic morality are aligned, then the informal economy will not prevail. 
However, when civic morality is not aligned with state morality, such as when there is a lack 
of trust in government, then there will be a greater prevalence of the informal economy.  
To evaluate the validity of this institutional asymmetry thesis, a way of measuring 
institutional asymmetry is required. When studying the informal economy, this can be 
measured using µWD[PRUDOH¶, which refers WRWKHSRSXODWLRQ¶Vmorality regarding engagement 
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in the informal economy (Alm and Torgler, 2006; CannDULDQG'¶$OHVVLRMcKerchar 
et al, 2013). Using this, the following hypothesis can be tested: 
 
Institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H1): the prevalence of the informal economy will 
be greater in populations with lower levels of tax morale. 
 
If valid, it is important to understand what determines the lack of alignment of state morality 
and civic morality. Until now, the tax morale literature has conducted various exploratory 
analyses. On the one hand, studies of a range of socio-demographic and socio-economic 
variables have revealed that tax morale is lower among men, single people, the upper classes, 
the unemployed and self-employed, and increases with age, religiosity and income but is 
negatively related to education level (Alm and Torgler, 2006; CannDULDQG'¶$OHVVLR, 2007; 
Torgler and Schneider, 2007).  
On the other hand, exploratory analyses of a range of country-level variables have 
revealed that national pride increases tax morale (Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009), as do 
satisfaction with public services (Russo, 2013) and trust in government and the judiciary 
(Daude et al. 2013; Giachi, 2014; Martinez-Vazquez and Torgler, 2009), lower levels of 
perceived corruption (Dong et al., 2013), trust in others to obey the law (Giachi, 2014), 
higher tax rates (Lago-Peñas and Lago-Peñas, 2010) and greater social security expenditure 
(Kanniainen and Pääkkönen, 2009).  
In this paper however, a more structured approach is adopted. Here, we select 
country-level variables to test the three existing theories explaining the varying prevalence of 
the informal economy. The intention however is not to test these theories as free-standing 
explanations of the informal economy but rather, to identify the structural conditions that lead 
to lower institutional asymmetry.  
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As Williams (2014b,c) highlights, previous explanations of the informal economy can 
be grouped into three major theories. )LUVWO\µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ¶theory argues that the informal 
economy becomes less prevalent with economic development and the modernisation of 
government (Geertz, 1963; Lewis, 1959). Applying this to understanding tax morale, this 
perspective would thus view the degree of institutional asymmetry as greater in less developed 
economies, measured in terms of GNP per capita, and societies in which there is a lack of 
modernisation of government. To test this, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
  
Modernity hypothesis (H2): the degree of institutional asymmetry will be greater in 
poorer economies with unmodernised state bureaucracies. 
 
6HFRQGO\µQHR-OLEHUDO¶theory claims that the informal economy results from high taxes and 
state interference and thus that reducing taxes and the level of state interference in work and 
welfare is the way forward (De Soto, 1989; 2001; London and Hart, 2004; Nwabuzor, 2005; 
Schneider and Williams, 2013). Viewed through this lens, the degree of institutional 
asymmetry will be greater in those nations with higher taxes and levels of state interference in 
work and welfare systems. As such, the following hypothesis can be evaluated: 
 
Neo-liberal hypothesis (H3): the degree of institutional asymmetry will be greater in 
economies with higher tax rates and levels of state interference. 
 
7KLUGDQGILQDOO\µSROLWLFDOHFRQRP\¶theory, in stark contrast to neo-liberal theory, claims 
that the informal economy directly results from inadequate levels of state intervention in work 
and welfare arrangements, which leaves workers less than fully safeguarded and thus 
dependent on the informal economy as a survival strategy in the absence of other means of 
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livelihood and support (Davis, 2006; Gallin, 2001; ILO, 2014; Slavnic, 2010; Taiwo, 2013). 
As such, the informal economy is to be tackled by increasing expenditure on labour market 
interventions to protect vulnerable groups and increasing social protection expenditure. From 
this perspective therefore, the degree of institutional asymmetry will be higher in countries 
with relatively low levels of such state interventions. The following hypothesis can be 
therefore evaluated: 
 
Political economy hypothesis (H4): the degree of institutional asymmetry is greater in 
more equal economies with lower tax rates, levels of social protection and public 
sector intervention in labour markets which safeguard citizens from poverty. 
 
Until now, evaluations of these competing theories have simply used bivariate correlations 
(European Commission, 2013; Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014b,c,d). These reveal support 
for the modernisation and political economy theories but little or no support for neo-liberal 
theory. None have evaluated whether these bivariate associations remain significant when 
other variables are introduced and held constant, or whether the informal economy is 
associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry. Here, therefore, these gaps are filled.  
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
To analyse this institutional asymmetry thesis and what determines the level of institutional 
asymmetry, data is reported from special Eurobarometer survey no. 402, which involved 
8,548 face-to-face interviews conducted in 2013 in eight Baltic nations (Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Estonia, Germany, Denmark, Finland and Sweden). In all eight Baltic countries, a 
multi-stage random (probability) sampling methodology was employed. This ensured that for 
each country, the sample was representative of the population in terms of gender, age, region 
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and locality size. For univariate analysis therefore, we employ the sample weighting scheme 
as recommended in both the wider literature (Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994) 
and the Eurobarometer methodology, to obtain meaningful descriptive results. For the 
multivariate analysis however, a debate exists over whether to use a weighting scheme. 
Reflecting the dominant viewpoint, the decision has been taken not to do so (Pfefferman, 
1994; Sharon and Liu, 1994; Solon et al., 2013; Winship and Radbill, 1994).  
 The face-to-face interview schedule firstly asked attitudinal questions regarding 
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶views on the acceptability of engaging in the informal economy, followed by 
questions on whether participants purchased goods and services from the informal economy 
and participated in informal work. In this paper, we focus upon the attitudinal questions to 
examine the level of tax morale and thus the degree of institutional asymmetry. To do this, we 
analyse SDUWLFLSDQWV¶UHVSRQVHVWRsix questions that rate the acceptability of various types of 
informal work on a 10-point Likert scale (where 1 means absolutely unacceptable and 10 
means absolutely acceptable), namely: 
(1) an individual is hired by a household for work and s/he does not declare the payment 
received to the tax or social security authorities even though it should be declared;  
(2) a firm is hired by a household for work and it does not declare the payment received to the 
tax or social security authorities;  
(3) a firm is hired by another firm for work and it does not declare its activities to the tax or 
social security authorities;  
(4) a firm hires an individual and all or a part of the wages paid to him\ her are not officially 
declared and  
(5) someone receives welfare payments without entitlement;  
(6) someone evades taxes by not declaring or only partially declaring their income. 
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Collating the responses to these six questions, an aggregate µtax morale index¶ is constructed 
for each individual, population group and country. Using the 10-point Likert scale format, the 
higher is the index value the greater is the degree of institutional asymmetry and thus the lower 
is the tax morale. 
To analyse the hypotheses therefore, the dependent variable is the degree of 
institutional asymmetry, measured using this tax morale index. As the dependent variable is a 
10-point Likert scale index, we employ ordered logistic regressions. To analyse H1, the 
variable used measuring participation in the informal economy is: 
x Participaton in the informal economy: a dummy variable with recorded value 1 for 
SHUVRQV ZKR DQVZHUHG ³\HV´ WR WKH TXHVWLRQ µ+ave you yourself carried out any 
undeclared paid activities in the last 12 months?¶ and recorded value 0 otherwise. 
To both analyse tax morale across population groups, the socio-demographic, socio-economic 
and spatial variables identified above as important in previous studies of tax morale are 
analysed, namely:  
x Gender: a dummy variable with value 1 for men and 0 for women. 
x Age: a numerical variable for the exact age of the respondent. 
x Level in society: a 10-point Likert scale variable for the respondent perception regarding 
the level in society to which it belongs, coded from 1(the lowest level in society) to 10 
(the highest level in society). 
x Difficulties paying bills: a dummy variable for the respondent difficulties in paying bills 
with value 1 for having difficulties and value 0 for not having difficulties in paying bills. 
x Employment: a dummy variable with value 1 for employed respondents and 0 for 
unemployed respondents. 
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x Area respondent lives: a categorical variable for the area where the respondent lives with 
value 1 for rural area or village, value 2 for small or middle sized town, and value 3 for 
large town. 
x Country: a categorical variable for the country where the respondent lives with value 1 
for Germany, value 2 for Denmark, value 3 for Finland, value 4 for Sweden, value 5 for 
Estonia, value 6 for Latvia, value 7 for Lithuania, and value 8 for Poland. 
Meanwhile, to analyse hypotheses H2-4 regarding the country-level determinants of tax 
morale, various structural conditions are analysed, whilst holding constant the above 
individual-level characteristics. To evaluate the modernisation hypothesis (H2), the indicators 
used are: 
x GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (Eurostat, 2014a),  
x European Quality of Government Index ± this includes both perceptions and experiences 
with public sector corruption, along with the extent to which citizens believe various 
public sector services are impartially allocated and of good quality. The index is 
standardised with a mean of zero, with higher scores marking a higher quality of 
government (Charron et al., 2014). 
x Employment participation rate - calculated by dividing the number of persons aged 15 to 
64 in employment by the total population of the same age group (Eurostat, 2014b). 
To evaluate the tax tenet of the neo-liberal hypothesis (H3), the indicators previously 
employed when evaluating this perspective in relation to the informal economy (European 
Commission, 2013; Williams, 2014a,b,c,d) are used, namely the: 
x Implicit tax rate (ITR) on labour, which approximates to the average effective tax burden 
RQODERXUDQGLVWKHVXPRIDOOGLUHFWDQGLQGLUHFWWD[HVDQGHPSOR\HHV¶DQGHPSOR\HUV¶
social contributions levied on employed labour income divided by the total 
compensation of employees (Eurostat, 2014c). 
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x Current taxes on income, wealth, etc, which covers all compulsory, unrequited 
payments, in cash or in kind, levied periodically by general government and by the rest 
of the world on the income and wealth of institutional units, and some periodic taxes 
assessed neither on income nor wealth (Eurostat 2014d). 
To evaluate the contrasting views on the influence of state intervention of the neo-liberal (H3) 
and political economy (H4) hypotheses meanwhile, the indicators analysed, akin to previous 
studies (European Commission, 2013; Eurofound, 2013; Williams, 2014a,b,c,d), are:  
x The level of income inequality, measured using the income quintile share ratio S80/S20, 
which is the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population with the highest 
income (the top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the population with the lowest 
income (the bottom quintile) (Eurostat, 2014e); 
x The level of severe material deprivation, measured by the percentage of the population 
unable to afford at least four items on a list of nine items considered by most people to 
be desirable or even necessary to lead an adequate life (Eurostat 2014f); 
x Public expenditure on labour market interventions aimed at correcting disequilibria. This 
covers all public interventions in the labour market aimed at reaching its efficient 
functioning and correcting disequilibria which explicitly target groups with difficulties in 
the labour market, namely: the unemployed; those employed but at risk of involuntary 
job loss; and people who are currently inactive in the labour market but would like to 
work (Eurostat 2014g); 
x Social protection expenditure contain: social benefits, which consist of transfers, in cash 
or in kind, to households and individuals to relieve them of the burden of a defined set of 
risks or needs; administration costs, which represent the costs charged to the scheme for 
its management and administration; other expenditure, which consists of miscellaneous 
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expenditure by social protection schemes (payment of property income and other). It is 
calculated in current prices as percentage of GDP (Eurostat, 2014h); and 
x The impact of social transfers, which is a computed indicator based on the formula, 
100*(B-A)/B, where B=the proportion at-risk of poverty before social transfers 
excluding pensions (which is the share of people having an equivalised disposable 
income before social transfers that is below the at-risk-of-poverty threshold calculated 
after social transfers), and A= the proportion at risk-of-poverty (which is the share of 
people with an equivalised disposable income (after social transfers) below the 
at-risk-of-poverty threshold, which is set at 60% of the national median equivalised 
disposable income after social transfers) (European Commission, 2013). 
To evaluate the institutional asymmetry hypothesis (H1), and given the nonparametric nature 
of the data, firstly, a two-sample Wilcoxon rank-sum (Mann-Whitney) test evaluates whether 
the median tax morale of participants in the informal economy significantly differs to the 
median score of those not participatingZKLOVWVHFRQGO\D6SHDUPDQ¶VELYDULDWHFRrrelation is 
evaluates whether a statistically significant relationship exists between cross-national 
variations in tax morale and participation in the informal economy. To evaluate whether H1 
remains valid when a range of individual- and country-level variables are introduced, an 
ordered logistic regression analysis is then provided.  
To evaluate the three hypotheses (H2-4) investigating the country-level determinants 
of tax morale meanwhile, and given the significant correlation between these country-level 
structural conditions, an ordered logistic regression analysis is employed, adding each 
structural condition in turn to the individual-level variables to evaluate whether they are 
significantly associated with the degree of institutional asymmetry. 
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4. FINDINGS 
Table 1 reports the level of tax morale and prevalence of the informal economy across various 
population groups in all eight Baltic countries surveyed (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Estonia, 
Germany, Denmark, Finland, Sweden). This displays that men, younger age groups, those 
who self-classify themselves as in the lower levels of society, those having difficulties paying 
the household bills, the employed and those living in rural areas have a lower tax morale. The 
same trends are identified when examining participation in the informal economy. To test 
whether those with lower tax morale are also more likely to participate in the informal 
economy, a Wilcoxon Rank Sum test reveals that this relationship is statistically significant. 
Those participating in the informal economy have a median tax morale index score of 4 
compared with a score of 2 for those not participating in the informal economy (where 
1=totally unacceptable and 10=totally acceptable across six tax non-compliance behaviours). 
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Table 1 also reveals the cross-national variations. The level of tax morale is lowest in the 
post-communist societies of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Estonia, whilst civic morality is 
better aligned with state morality in the western societies of Sweden, Finland, Denmark and 
Germany. To test whether participation in the informal economy is greater in those countries 
with lower levels of tax morale, D 6SHDUPDQ¶V ELYDULDWH DQDO\VLV reveals a statistically 
significant association (p<0.001***).    
To determine whether this association remains significant when other characteristics 
are taken into account and held constant, Table 2 reports the results of an ordered logistic 
regression analysis. Model 1 examines whether this association remains significant when 
purely individual-level characteristics are added, and models 2-11 when various 
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country-level variables are further added. The first row in models 1-11 reveal that the level 
tax morale remains strongly associated with the prevalence of the informal economy across 
all models, whether individual-level characteristics alone are analysed, or various 
country-level structural conditions are further added. As tax morale improves, the prevalence 
of the informal economy significantly declines. This positively confirms the institutional 
asymmetry hypothesis (H1). 
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Model 1 also identifies that when other factors are held constant, men have lower tax morale 
than women and tax morale decreases with age and with a higher position in society. Strong 
evidence also exists that those having difficulties paying their household bills and those 
living in urban areas have lower tax morale.  
Models 2-11 meanwhile, test hypotheses H2-4 regarding the country-level 
determinants of tax morale. Given that partial correlations reveal that these country-level 
variables are strongly correlated with each other, each is here analysed in separate models. 
Starting with the modernity hypothesis (H2), models 2, 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that 
tax morale improves with higher levels of GDP per capita, higher qualities of government and 
higher employment participation rates. This positively confirms the modernisation thesis.  
Models 5 and 6 meanwhile, reveal a significant relationship between tax morale and 
taxation. However, the direction of the association is in the opposite direction to that 
suggested by neo-liberal theory. Tax morale improves as the tax rates increases. This therefore 
tentatively negatively confirms the neo-liberal hypothesis (H4) and positively confirms the 
political economy hypothesis (H4). Caution however, needs to be exercised in terms of not 
reading into this a cause-effect relationship. This cannot be simply interpreted as meaning that 
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higher tax morale is a consequence of higher tax rates. The taxation level could also be a 
consequence of tax morale, exemplified by governments in post-communist societies being 
unable to raise taxation levels due to the low tax morale of the population. Models 7 and 8 
furthermore, provide strong evidence that institutional asymmetry is lower in countries with 
lower levels of severe material deprivation and lower income inequalities, and models 9, 10 
and 11 strong evidence that tax morale improves with higher levels of public expenditure on 
labour market interventions, higher levels of social protection expenditure and more effective 
redistribution via social transfers, providing further positive confirmation for the political 
hypothesis (H4). 
 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Drawing upon institutional theory, this paper has proposed a new way of explaining and 
tackling the informal economy. Evaluating its validity in the context of eight Baltic countries, 
the above analysis reveals that when the codified laws and regulations of formal institutions 
(state morality) are not aligned with the values, norms and beliefs of informal institutions 
(civic morality), participation in the informal economy occurs. The greater is the level of 
institutional asymmetry, the greater is the prevalence of the informal economy.  
To reduce the prevalence of the informal economy therefore, what is required is a 
policy shift away from the current approach which seeks to detect and punish those operating 
in the informal economy and towards an approach that seeks to reduce this institutional 
asymmetry. On the one hand, this requires policies to re-align civic morality with state 
morality. Firstly, this requires citizen education regarding the importance of the social contract 
in general, and paying taxes more particularly, such as by providing information on the public 
goods and services paid for by taxation. At present, governments have not done this, 
especially in those Baltic countries where tax morale is low. Secondly, therefore, advertising 
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campaigns are required informing citizens about the virtues of adhering to the social contract 
between the state and its citizens regarding the payment of taxes and the costs of violating this 
social contract. In these Baltic countries, as model 1 in Table 2 reveals, such campaigns could 
usefully be targeted at men, younger age groups, those living in urban areas and other groups 
shown above to have lower levels of tax morale. 
 To align civic morality and state morality nevertheless, formal institutions also need 
to change. On the one hand, and as model 3 in Table 2 clearly reveals, citizens will not 
improve their tax morale if there remains a low level of trust in government and extensive 
public sector corruption, as is the case in those Baltic countries where tax morale is lowest 
and the informal economy more prevalent (European Commission, 2014a,b). To tackle this, 
a modernisation of governance is needed. This requires improvement in procedural and 
redistributive justice and fairness so that citizens believe that the authorities are treating them 
in a respectful, impartial and responsible manner, that they believe they pay their fair share 
and received the goods and services they deserve (Molero and Pujol, 2012; Murphy, 2005).  
On the other hand, and as models 4-11 in Table 2 display, wider economic and social 
developments are also required to align civic morality and state morality. These models 
clearly reveal how Baltic countries with higher tax rates, greater income equality, higher 
expenditure on labour market interventions to help vulnerable groups, higher expenditure on 
social protection and more effective redistribution via social transfers, have lower levels of 
institutional asymmetry and thus smaller informal economies. In consequence, for the 
post-communist Baltic countries with relatively lower levels of progress on these wider 
economic and social developments (e.g., Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia), greater attention to them 
is required if institutional asymmetry is to reduce, and thus the informal economy be tackled. 
For the more affluent western Baltic countries with established market economies who are 
UHODWLYHO\µSURJUHVVLYH¶RQWKHVHIURQWVhowever (e.g., Germany, Finland), the policy approach 
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will need to be more attentive to pursuing tax education and advertising campaigns to improve 
civic morality, and the pursuit of procedural and redistributive justice and fairness to elicit 
greater alignment of civic morality with formal institutions.  
 In sum, this paper has proposed a new way of explaining and tackling the informal 
economy which tentatively views the informal economy to be associated with the lack of 
alignment of state morality and civic morality. Whether this institutional asymmetry approach 
is also valid when explaining and tackling the informal economy across post-communist 
East-Central Europe more generally and in other global regions and countries now needs to be 
evaluated. So too is an evaluation required of whether such an association is applicable over 
time within individual countries (e.g., the informal economy shrinks as the degree of 
institutional asymmetry falls, and vice versa). If this paper stimulates such evaluations, it will 
have fulfilled one of its intentions. If it also stimulates governments to recognise how the 
informal economy is closely associated with the asymmetry between state morality and civic 
morality, and to begin discussing policy measures for improving tax morale, rather than 
continuing to simply detect and punish participation in the informal economy, then this paper 
will have achieved its broader goal.  
 
REFERENCES 
ALM, J. and TORGLER, B. (2006), µCulture differences and tax morale in the United States 
and in Europe¶Journal of Economic Psychology, 27 (2), pp. 224-46. 
ANDREWS, D., CALDERA SANCHEZ, A. and JOHANSSON, A. (2011), Towards a Better 
Understanding of the Informal Economy, Paris: OECD Economics Department 
Working Paper no. 873, OECD. 
BARBOUR, A. and LLANES, M. (2013), Supporting People to Legitimise their Informal 
Businesses, York: Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
19 
 
BAUMOL, W. J. and BLINDER, A. (2008), Macroeconomics: principles and policy, 
Cincinnati, OH: South-Western Publishing. 
CANNARI, L. DQG'¶$LESSIO, G. (2007), /H2SLQLRPLGHJOL,WDOLDQLVXOO¶(YDVLRQH)LVFDOH, 
Rome: Temi di Discussione, Bank of Italy. 
CHARRON, N., DIJKSTRA, L. and LAPUENTE, V. (2014), µMapping the regional divide 
in Europe: a measure for assessing quality of government in 206 European regions¶
Social Indicators Research. DOI: 10.1007/s11205-014-0702-y. 
DAUDE, C., GUTIERREZ, H. and MELGUIZO, A. (2013), µWhat drives tax morale? a focus 
on emerging economies¶, Review of Public Economics, 207 (4), pp. 9-40. 
DAVIS, M. (2006), Planet of Slums, London, Verso.  
DE SOTO, H. (1989), The Other Path: the economic answer to terrorism, London: Harper 
and Row. 
DE SOTO, H. (2001), The Mystery of Capital: why capitalism triumphs in the West and fails 
everywhere else, London: Black Swan. 
DONG, B., DULLECK, U. and TORGLER, B. (2012), µConditional corruption¶Journal of 
Economic Psychology, 33 (4), pp. 609±627. 
EUROFOUND (2013), Tackling Undeclared Work in 27 European Union Member States and 
Norway: approaches and measures since 2008, Dublin: Eurofound. 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2007), Stepping up the Fight against Undeclared Work, 
Brussels: European Commission.  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2013), Economic and Social Developments in Europe 2013, 
Brussels: European Commission.  
EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014a), )ODVK (XUREDURPHWHU  %XVLQHVV¶ DWWLWXGHV
towards corruption in the EU, Brussels: European Commission. 
20 
 
EUREOPAN COMMISSION (2014b), Special Eurobarometer 397: Corruption, Brussels: 
European Commission. 
EUROSTAT (2014a), GDP per capita in PPS. Available 
at:http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&langua
ge=en&pcode=tec00114 
EUROSTAT (2014b), Employment rate. Available at: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/submitViewTableAction.do  
EUROSTAT (2014c), Implicit tax rate on labour, Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcod
e=tec00119&plugin=0 
EUROSTAT (2014d), Current taxes on income, wealth etc, Available at 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcod
e=tec00018&plugin=0 
EUROSTAT (2014e), Income inequalities. Available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&language=en&pcod
e=tessi180&plugin=1 
EUROSTAT (2014f), Severe material deprivation. Available at: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=ilc_mddd11&lang=en 
EUROSTAT (2014g), Public expenditure on labour market interventions, Available at: 
http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lmp_expsumm&lang=en 
EUROSTAT (2014h), Social protection expenditure ,Available at
 http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=spr_exp_sum&lang=en 
GALLIN, D. (2001), µPropositions on trade unions and informal employment in time of 
globalisation¶Antipode, 19 (4), pp. 531-549. 
21 
 
GEERTZ, C. (1963), Old Societies and New States: the quest for modernity in Asia and 
Africa, Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 
GIACHI, S. (2014), µSocial dimensions of tax evasion: trust and tax morale in contemporary 
Spain¶Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, 145, pp. 73-98. 
HELMKE, G. and LEVITSKY, S. (2004), µInformal institutions and comparative politics: a 
research agenda¶Perspectives on Politics, 2 (6), pp. 725-40. 
ILO (2012), Statistical Update on Employment in the Informal Economy, Geneva: 
International Labour Organisation. 
ILO (2013), Women and Men in the Informal Economy: statistical picture, available at 
http://laborsta.ilo.org/informal_economy_E.html (last accessed 18 December 2014) 
ILO (2014), Transitioning from the informal to the formal economy. Report V (1), 
International Labour Conference, 103rd Session (2014), Geneva: ILO. 
KANNIAINEN, V. and PAAKONNEN, J. (2010), µDo the catholic and protestant countries 
differ by their tax morale?¶Empirica, 37 (2), pp. 271±290. 
KESTELOOT, C. and MEERT, H. (1999), µInformal spaces: the geography of informal 
economic activities in Brussels¶International Journal of Urban and Regional 
Research, 23 (2), pp. 232-251. 
KUKK, M. and STAEHR, K. (2014), µIncome underreporting by households with business 
income: evidence from Estonia¶Post-Communist Economies, 26 (2), pp. 257-226. 
LAGO-PENAS, I. and LAGO-PENAS, S. (2010), µThe determinants of tax morale in 
comparative perspective: Evidence from European countries¶European Journal of 
Political Economy, 26, pp. 441±453. 
LEWIS, A. (1959), The Theory of Economic Growth, London, Allen and Unwin. 
LONDON, T. and HART, S. L. (2004), µReinventing strategies for emerging markets: beyond 
the transnational model¶Journal of International Business Studies, 35 (5), pp. 350-70. 
22 
 
MARTINEZ-VAZQUEZ, J. and TORGLER, B. (2009), µThe evolution of tax morale in 
modern Spain¶Journal of Economic Issues, 43 (1), pp. 1±28. 
McKERCHAR, M., BLOOMQUIST, K. and POPE, J. (2013),¶ Indicators of tax morale: an 
exploratory study¶ eJournal of Tax Research, 11 (1), pp. 5-22.  
MERIKULL, J. and STAEHR, K. (2010), µUnreported employment and envelope wages in 
mid-transition: comparing developments and causes in the Baltic countries¶
Comparative Economic Studies, 52, pp. 637-70. 
MOLERO, J. C. and PUJOL, F. (2012), µ:DONLQJLQVLGHWKHSRWHQWLDOWD[HYDGHU¶VPLQGWD[
morale does matter¶Journal of Business Ethics, 105, pp. 151-162. 
MURPHY, K. (2005), µRegulating more effectively: the relationship between procedural 
justice, legitimacy and tax non-compliance¶Journal of Law and Society, 32 (4), pp. 
562-89. 
NORTH, D. C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
NWABUZOR, A. (2005), µCorruption and development: new initiatives in economic 
openness and strengthened rule of law¶Journal of Business Ethics, 59(1/2), 121-38. 
OECD (2012), Reducing Opportunities for Tax Non-Compliance in the Underground 
Economy, Paris: OECD. 
OECD (2014), Informal Entrepreneurship, Paris: OECD 
PEDERSEN, S. (2003), The Shadow Economy in Germany, Great Britain and Scandinavia: a 
measurement based on questionnaire surveys, Copenhagen: The Rockwool Foundation 
Research Unit.  
PFAU-EFFINGER, B. (2009), µVarieties of undeclared work in European societies¶British 
Journal of Industrial Relations, 47 (1), pp. 79-99. 
PFEFFERMANN, D. (1993), µThe role of sampling weights when modelling survey data¶
International Statistical Review, 61 (2), pp. 317-37. 
23 
 
PUTNINS, T. and SAUKA, A. (2014a), µMeasuring the shadow economy using company 
managers¶Journal of Comparative Economics 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2014.04.001 
PUTNINS, T. and SAUKA, A. (2014b), SSE Riga Shadow Index for the Baltic countries 
2009-2013, Riga: SSE Riga. 
RUSSO, F. F. (2013), µTax morale and tax evasion reports¶ Economics Letters, 121, pp. 110±
114. 
SCHNEIDER, F. (2008), (ed.) The Hidden Economy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
SCHNEIDER, F. and WILLIAMS, C. C. (2013), The Shadow Economy, London: Institute of 
Economic Affairs. 
SCOTT, W. R. (1995), Institutions and Organizations, Thousand Oaks CA: Sage   
SHARON, L. and LIU, J. (1994), µA comparison of weighted and unweighted analyses in the 
National Crime Victimization Survey¶Journal of Quantitative Criminology, 10 (4), 
pp. 343-60. 
SLAVNIC, Z. (2010), µPolitical economy of informalisation¶European Societies, 12 (1), pp. 
3-23. 
SOLON, G., HAIDER, S. J. and WOOLDRIDGE, J. (2013), What are we weighting for? 
Bucharest: National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 8. 
TAIWO, O. (2013), µEmployment choice and mobility in multi-sector labour markets: 
theoretical model and evidence from Ghana¶International Labour Review, 152, pp. 
69-92. 
TORGLER, B. and SCHNEIDER, F. (2007), Shadow economy, tax morale, governance and 
institutional quality: a panel analysis, Bonn: IZA Discussion Paper no. 2563, IZA.   
TUC (2008), Hard Work, Hidden Lives: the short report of the Commission on Vulnerable 
Employment, London: TUC 
24 
 
WILLIAMS, C. C. (2009), µEvaluating the extent and nature of envelope wages in the 
European Union: a geographical analysis¶, European Spatial Research and Policy, 16 
(1), pp. 115±129. 
WILLIAMS, C. C. (2014a), Confronting the Shadow Economy: evaluating tax compliance 
and behaviour policies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
WILLIAMS, C. C. (2014b), µExplaining cross-national variations in the prevalence of 
envelope wages: some lessons from a 2013 Eurobarometer survey¶ Industrial 
Relations Journal, 45 (6), 524-542.   
WILLIAMS, C. C. (2014c), ³Explaining cross-national variations in the prevalence and 
FKDUDFWHU RI XQGHFODUHG HPSOR\PHQW LQ WKH (XURSHDQ 8QLRQ´ European Spatial 
Research and Policy, Vol. 21, No.2, pp. 115-132. 
WILLIAMS, C. C. (2014d), µOut of the shadows: a classification of economies by the size and 
character of their informal sector¶, Work, Employment and Society, 28 (5), pp. 735±53. 
WILLIAMS, C.C. and HORODNIC, I. (2015), µRethinking the marginalisation thesis: an 
evaluation of the socio-spatial variations in undeclared work in the European Union¶, 
Employee Relations, 37 (1), pp. 48±65.  
WILLIAMS, C. C., NADIN, S. and WINDEBANK, J. (2012), µEvaluating the prevalence and 
nature of self-employment in the informal economy: evidence from a 27-nation 
European survey¶, European Spatial Research and Policy, 19 (1), pp. 129-142. 
WINSHIP, C. and RADBILL, L. (1994), µSampling weights and regression analysis¶ 
Sociological Methods and Research, 23 (2), pp. 230-57. 
 
 
  
25 
 
Table 1. Tax morality index and the prevalence of the informal economy in Baltic nations: by 
individual group and country 
 
N = 8,548 Tax morality 
index (where 1 
= totally 
unacceptable 
and 10 = totally 
acceptable) 
% engaged in 
informal 
economy 
% of all doing 
informal work 
% of all 
population 
¼HDUQings 
from informal 
economy 
(mean) 
All Baltic nations 2.39 3 100 100 676 
Informal work:      
Yes 3.67 -- -- 3 -- 
No 2.33 -- -- 97 -- 
Gender:      
Men 2.48 4 64 48 734 
Female 2.31 2 36 52 586 
Age:      
15-24 2.90 7 29 14 543 
25-34 2.55 5 20 15 782 
35-44 2.53 4 18 16 1127 
45-54 2.46 4 20 18 357 
55-64 2.17 2 9 15 866 
65+ 1.95 1 4 22 343 
Level in society:      
Low level 2.57 5 33 22 620 
Middle level 2.37 3 46 53 644 
High level 2.29 3 21 25 802 
Difficulty paying bills:      
Not having difficulties 2.23 2 54 76 674 
Having difficulties 2.91 7 46 24 694 
Employment:      
Employed 2.44 4 58 52 787 
Unemployed 2.34 3 42 48 495 
Area:      
Rural/village 2.56 2 23 34 799 
Small/middle town 2.29 4 47 40 638 
Large town 2.35 4 30 26 640 
Country:      
Latvia 3.98 11 4 1 478 
Lithuania 3.16 8 5 2 696 
Poland 2.97 3 27 27 438 
Estonia 2.96 11 3 1 885 
Germany 2.16 2 35 54 479 
Denmark 2.01 9 10 4 821 
Finland 1.96 3 3 4 420 
Sweden 1.93 7 13 7 1346 
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Table. 2. Prevalence of institutional asymmetry in Baltic nations: ordered logistic model 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Informal work (Not engaged in informal work)      
Engaged in informal work 1.270*** (0.0873) 1.273*** (0.0867) 1.331*** (0.0866) 1.336*** (0.0867) 1.215*** (0.0868) 1.365*** (0.0872) 
Gender (Women)       
Men 0.212*** (0.0422) 0.275*** (0.0427) 0.255*** (0.0427) 0.257*** (0.0425) 0.241*** (0.0426) 0.234*** (0.0425) 
Age (exact age) -0.0219*** (0.0013) -0.0185*** (0.0013) -0.0173*** (0.0013) -0.0192*** (0.0013) -0.0196*** (0.0013) -0.0196*** (0.0013) 
Level in society (Self placement) -0.106*** (0.0138) -0.0563*** (0.0140) -0.0416*** (0.0141) -0.0788*** (0.0139) -0.0802*** (0.0139) -0.0614*** (0.0140) 
Difficulty paying bills (Not having difficulties)      
Having difficulties 0.663*** (0.0492) 0.324*** (0.0511) 0.243*** (0.0517) 0.437*** (0.0505) 0.408*** (0.0507) 0.418*** (0.0508) 
Employment (Unemployed)       
Employed 0.0406 (0.0444) 0.0442 (0.0448) 0.0295 (0.0448) 0.0676 (0.0447) 0.0296 (0.0448) 0.0386 (0.0447) 
Area (Rural/ village)       
Small/middle town -0.346*** (0.0500) -0.227*** (0.0505) -0.230*** (0.0505) -0.277*** (0.0502) -0.286*** (0.0503) -0.289*** (0.0503) 
Large town -0.273*** (0.0549) -0.277*** (0.0554) -0.315*** (0.0555) -0.260*** (0.0552) -0.305*** (0.0554) -0.311*** (0.0552) 
GDP per capita in PPS 2013  -0.0222*** (0.0009)     
European Quality of Government Index 2013   -0.709*** (0.0267)    
Employment participation 2013    -0.0925*** (0.0048)   
Implicit tax rate on labour 2012     -0.186*** (0.0086)  
Current taxes on income, wealth, etc. 2013     -0.0535*** (0.0029) 
Constant cut1 -2.203*** (0.120) -4.042*** (0.143) -2.162*** (0.121) -8.317*** (0.342) -8.713*** (0.325) -2.642*** (0.123) 
Constant cut2 -1.019*** (0.118) -2.792*** (0.139) -0.899*** (0.119) -7.097*** (0.339) -7.480*** (0.321) -1.419*** (0.121) 
Constant cut3 -0.117 (0.118) -1.829*** (0.137) 0.0712 (0.119) -6.158*** (0.336) -6.538*** (0.319) -0.487*** (0.120) 
Constant cut4 0.653*** (0.119) -1.016*** (0.137) 0.892*** (0.121) -5.358*** (0.335) -5.738*** (0.318) 0.302** (0.121) 
Constant cut5 1.430*** (0.123) -0.211 (0.140) 1.704*** (0.125) -4.561*** (0.335) -4.941*** (0.318) 1.093*** (0.125) 
Constant cut6 2.149*** (0.131) 0.524*** (0.147) 2.443*** (0.132) -3.831*** (0.337) -4.211*** (0.321) 1.820*** (0.132) 
Constant cut7 2.837*** (0.144) 1.222*** (0.159) 3.145*** (0.146) -3.136*** (0.342) -3.515*** (0.326) 2.514*** (0.146) 
Constant cut8 3.523*** (0.168) 1.912*** (0.180) 3.837*** (0.169) -2.448*** (0.353) -2.825*** (0.337) 3.202*** (0.169) 
Constant cut9 4.546*** (0.234) 2.937*** (0.243) 4.863*** (0.235) -1.424*** (0.389) -1.800*** (0.374) 4.227*** (0.235) 
N 7603 7603 7603 7603 7603 7603 
Pseudo R2 0.0470 0.0711 0.0757 0.0617 0.0660 0.0608 
Log likelihood -12084.644 -11779.252 -11720.620 -11898.012 -11843.137 -11909.587 
Ȥ2 1149.46 1709.46 1787.62 1492.22 1613.29 1414.43 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust standard errors in parentheses); All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
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Table 2. Prevalence of institutional asymmetry in Baltic nations: ordered logistic model - continued 
 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 
Informal work (Not engaging in informal work)     
Engaged in informal work 1.281*** (0.0866) 1.179*** (0.0869) 1.337*** (0.0871) 1.269*** (0.0869) 1.343*** (0.0870) 
Gender (Women)      
Men 0.243*** (0.0426) 0.249*** (0.0426) 0.240*** (0.0425) 0.265*** (0.0426) 0.242*** (0.0426) 
Age (exact age) -0.0176*** (0.0013) -0.0176*** (0.0013) -0.0199*** (0.0013) -0.0188*** (0.0013) -0.0177*** (0.0013) 
Level in society (Self placement) -0.0622*** (0.0139) -0.0506*** (0.0140) -0.0645*** (0.0140) -0.0520*** (0.0140) -0.0335** (0.0142) 
Difficulty paying bills (Not having difficulties)      
Having difficulties 0.202*** (0.0522) 0.301*** (0.0511) 0.380*** (0.0509) 0.280*** (0.0515) 0.431*** (0.0502) 
Employment (Unemployed)      
Employed 0.0236 (0.0448) 0.000845 (0.0448) 0.0293 (0.0447) 0.0255 (0.0448) 0.0187 (0.0448) 
Area (rural/village)      
Small/middle town -0.245*** (0.0503) -0.220*** (0.0505) -0.266*** (0.0504) -0.226*** (0.0505) -0.236*** (0.0506) 
Large town -0.301*** (0.0554) -0.284*** (0.0554) -0.321*** (0.0553) -0.307*** (0.0554) -0.294*** (0.0553) 
Severe material deprivation 2012 0.0806*** (0.0030)     
Income inequality 2012  0.755*** (0.0283)    
Public expenditure on labour market interventions 2011  -0.485*** (0.0234)   
Social protection expenditure 2011    -0.0863*** (0.0034)  
Impact of social transfers 2012     -0.0519*** (0.0023) 
Constant cut1 -1.163*** (0.127) 1.747*** (0.190) -2.754*** (0.124) -3.986*** (0.141) -3.632*** (0.137) 
Constant cut2 0.0906 (0.126) 3.004*** (0.191) -1.520*** (0.121) -2.729*** (0.137) -2.387*** (0.133) 
Constant cut3 1.067*** (0.127) 3.977*** (0.194) -0.578*** (0.120) -1.762*** (0.135) -1.439*** (0.131) 
Constant cut4 1.901*** (0.129) 4.807*** (0.197) 0.220* (0.121) -0.948*** (0.135) -0.635*** (0.132) 
Constant cut5 2.727*** (0.134) 5.628*** (0.202) 1.016*** (0.125) -0.141 (0.138) 0.165 (0.135) 
Constant cut6 3.476*** (0.142) 6.374*** (0.208) 1.745*** (0.133) 0.595*** (0.145) 0.897*** (0.142) 
Constant cut7 4.184*** (0.155) 7.079*** (0.217) 2.441*** (0.146) 1.295*** (0.157) 1.593*** (0.154) 
Constant cut8 4.878*** (0.177) 7.772*** (0.234) 3.131*** (0.169) 1.986*** (0.179) 2.282*** (0.177) 
Constant cut9 5.906*** (0.241) 8.799*** (0.285) 4.156*** (0.235) 3.012*** (0.242) 3.305*** (0.240) 
N 7603 7603 7603 7603 7603 
Pseudo R2 0.0756 0.0759 0.0648 0.0729 0.0685 
Log likelihood -11722.187 -11718.690 -11858.742 -11755.973 -11811.524 
Ȥ2 1779.50 1797.34 1478.47 1727.60 1644.68 
p> 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes: significant at *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 (robust standard errors in parentheses); All coefficients are compared to the benchmark category, shown in brackets. 
 
